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Abstract
The  year  2005  marked  the  start  of  a  new  era  in  global  conduct  of  business,  and  the
fulfillment of a thirty-year effort to create the financial reporting rules for a worldwide
capital market.  For during that year’s financial reporting cycle, as many as 7,000 listed
companies in the 25 European Union member states, plus many others in countries such as
Australia, New Zealand, Russia, and South Africa were expected (in the EU, required) to
produce annual financial statements in compliance with a single set of international rules—
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  Many other business entities, while
not publicly held and not currently required to comply with IFRS, will also do so, either
immediately  or  over  time,  in  order  to  conform  to  what  is  clearly  becoming  the  new
worldwide standard.  Since there are about 15,000 SEC-registered companies in the USA
that prepare financial statements in accordance with US GAAP (plus countless nonpublicly
held  companies  also  reporting  under  GAAP),  the  vast  majority  of  the  world’s  large
businesses  will  now  be  reporting  under  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  comprehensive
systems of accounting and financial reporting rules.
Most other national GAAP standards have been reduced in importance or are being phased
out as nations all over the worlds are now embracing IFRS.  For example, Canada has
announced that Canadian GAAP (which was very similar to US GAAP) will be eliminated
and replaced by IFRS by 2011.  More immediately, China will require listed companies to
employ IFRS.  It is quite predictable that only US GAAP will (for the foreseeable future)
remain as a competitive force in the accounting standards arena, and even that situation will
be  more  a  formality  than  a  substantive  reality,  given  the  formal  commitment  (and
substantial progress made to date) to “converge” US GAAP and IFRS.
Key words: IAS/AFRS, US GAAP, convergence, aceptance, International Accounting
Standards Board
Introduction
The  impetus  to convergence  of  presently  disparate  financial  reporting
standards has been, in the main, to facilitate the free flow of capital so that, for
example, investors in the United States will be willing to finance business in, say,
China  or  the  Czech  Republic.    Having  access  to  financial  statements  that  are
written in the same “language” would eliminate what has historically been a major
impediment to engendering investor confidence. Additionally, the ability to list a
company’s  securities  on  a  stock  exchange  has generally  required  filings  withStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
52
national regulatory authorities that have insisted on either conformity with local
GAAP or formal reconciliation to local GAAP.  Since either of these procedures
was  tedious  and  time  consuming,  and  the  human  resources  and  technical
knowledge  to  do  so  were  in  short  supply,  many  otherwise  anxious  would-be
registrants forwent the opportunity to broaden their investor bases and potentially
lower their cost of capital.
These difficulties may be coming to an end, however. The historic 2002
Norwalk Agreement between the US standard setter, FASB, and the IASB called
for “convergence” of the two sets of standards, and indeed a number of revisions of
either US GAAP or IFRS have already taken place to implement this commitment,
with more changes expected in the immediate future. More recently (late 2007), the
US  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  waived  the  longstanding  requirement
that foreign private issuers (i.e., registrants) filing financial statements prepared in
accordance with full IFRS (i.e., not European or other national versions of IFRS)
reconcile  those  financial  statements  to  US  GAAP.    Additionally,  the  SEC  is
weighing  a  rule  change  that  would  permit  US  domestic  registrants  to  choose
between compliance with US GAAP and IFRS. These current and prospective
changes, coupled with ongoing convergence efforts, seemingly portend a greatly
expanded usage of IFRS in world commerce.
It thus is expected that, by the end of the current decade, all or virtually all
distinctions between US GAAP and IFRS will be eliminated, although there remain
challenging issues to be resolved.  For one example, while IFRS has banned the use
of LIFO costing for inventories, it remains a popular financial reporting method
under US GAAP because of a “conformity rule” that permits entities to use the
method  for  tax  reporting  only  if  it  is  also  used  for  general-purpose  external
financial reporting.  In times of increasing costs, LIFO almost inevitably results in
tax savings (actually, deferrals), and is thus widely used.
Origins and Early History of the IASB
Financial  reporting  in  the  developed  world  evolved  from  two  broad
models, whose objectives were somewhat different. The earliest systematized form
of accounting regulation developed in continental Europe, starting in France in
1673. Here a requirement for an annual fair value balance sheet was introduced by
the government as a means of protecting the economy from bankruptcies. This
form of accounting at the initiative of the state to control economic actors was
copied by other states and later incorporated in the 1807 Napoleonic Commercial
Code.  This  method  of  regulating  the  economy  expanded  rapidly  throughout
continental  Europe,  partly  through  Napoleon’s  efforts  and  partly  through  a
willingness on the part of European regulators to borrow ideas from each other.
This “code law” family of reporting practices was much developed by Germany
after its 1870 unification, with the emphasis moving away from market values to
historical cost and systematic depreciation. It was used later by governments as the
basis of tax assessment when taxes on profits started to be introduced, mostly in the
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This  model  of  accounting  serves  primarily  as  a  means  of  moderating
relationships  between  the  individual  company  and  the  state.    It  serves  for  tax
assessment, and to limit dividend payments, and it is also a means of protecting the
running  of  the  economy  by  sanctioning  individual  businesses  that  are  not
financially sound or were run imprudently. While the model has been adapted for
stock  market  reporting  and  group (consolidated)  structures,  this  is  not  its  main
focus.
The other model did not appear until the nineteenth century and arose as a
consequence of the industrial revolution.  Industrialization created the need for
large concentrations of capital to undertake industrial projects (initially, canals and
railways) and to spread risks between many investors.  In this model the financial
report provided a means of monitoring the activities of large businesses in order to
inform  their  (nonmanagement)  shareholders.  Financial  reporting  for  capital
markets purposes developed initially in the UK, in a common-law environment
where  the  state  legislated  as  little  as  possible  and  left  a  large  degree  of
interpretation to practice and for the sanction of the courts. This approach was
rapidly adopted by the US as it, too, became industrialized. As the US developed
the idea of groups of companies controlled from a single head office (towards the
end  of  the  nineteenth  century),  this  philosophy  of  financial  reporting  began  to
become focused on consolidated accounts and the group, rather than the individual
company.  For different reasons, neither the UK nor the US governments saw this
reporting framework as appropriate for income tax purposes, and in this tradition,
while  the  financial  reports  inform  the  assessment  process,  taxation  retains  a
separate stream of law, which has had little influence on financial reporting.
The second model of financial reporting, generally regarded as the Anglo-
Saxon  financial  reporting  approach,  can  be  characterized  as  focusing  on  the
relationship between the business and the investor, and on the flow of information
to the capital markets. Government still uses reporting as a means of regulating
economic activity (e.g., the SEC’s mission is to protect the investor and ensure that
the  securities  markets  run  efficiently),  but  the  financial  report  is  aimed  at  the
investor, not the government.
Neither  of  the two  above-described  approaches  to  financial reporting  is
particularly useful in an agricultural economy, or to one that consists entirely of
microbusinesses, in the opinion of many observers. Nonetheless, as countries have
developed economically (or as they were colonized by industrialized nations) they
have adopted variants of one or the other of these two models.
IFRS are an example of the second, capital market-oriented, systems of
financial  reporting  rules.    The  original  international  standard  setter,  the
International  Accounting  Standards  Committee  (IASC),  was  formed  in  1973,
during a period of considerable change in accounting regulation.  In the US the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had just been created, in the UK
the first national standard setter had recently been organized, the EU was working
on the main plank of its own accounting harmonization plan (the Fourth Directive),
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committees. The IASC was launched in the wake of the 1972 World Accounting
Congress  (a  five-yearly  get-together  of  the  international  profession)  after  an
informal  meeting  between  representatives  of  the  British  profession  (Institute  of
Chartered  Accountants  in  England  and  Wales -  ICAEW)  and  the  American
profession (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants - AICPA).
A rapid set of negotiations resulted in the professional bodies of Canada,
Australia, Mexico, Japan, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand
being invited to join with the US and UK to form the international body.  Due to
pressure (coupled with a financial subsidy) from the UK, the IASC was established
in London, where its successor, the IASB, remains today.
The  actual  reasons  for  the  IASC’s  creation  are  unclear.  A  need  for  a
common  language  of  business  was  felt,  to  deal  with  a  growing  volume  of
international  business,  but  other,  more  political  motives  abounded  also.  For
example, some believe that the major motivation was that the British wanted to
create an international standard setter to trump the regional initiatives within the
EU, which leaned heavily to the Code model of reporting, in contrast to what was
the norm in the UK and almost all English-speaking nations.
In the first phase of its existence, the IASC had mixed fortunes. Once the
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) was formed in 1977 (at the next
World Congress of Accountants), the IASC had to fight off attempts to become a
part of IFAC.  It managed to resist, coming to a compromise where IASC remained
independent  but  all  IFAC  members  were  automatically  members  of  IASC,  and
IFAC was able to nominate the membership of the standard-setting Board.
Both the UN and OECD were active in international rule making in the
1970s but the IASC successfully persuaded them that they should leave recognition
and  measurement  rules  to  the  IASC.  However,  having  established  itself  as  the
unique international rule maker, IASC had great difficulty in persuading anyone to
use its rules. Although member professional bodies were theoretically committed
to pushing for the use of IFRS at the national level, in practice few national bodies
were  influential  in  standard  setting  in  their  respective  countries,  and  others
(including the US and UK) preferred their national standards to whatever IASC
might propose. In Europe, IFRS were used by some reporting entities in Italy and
Switzerland,  and  national  standard  setters  in  some  countries  such  as  Malaysia
began to use IFRS as an input to their national rules, while not necessarily adopting
them as written by the IASC or giving explicit recognition to the fact that IFRS
were being adopted in part as national GAAP.
IASC’s efforts entered a new phase in 1987, which led directly to its 2001
reorganization, when the then-Secretary General, David Cairns, encouraged by the
US SEC, negotiated an agreement with the International Organization of Securities
Commissions  (IOSCO).    IOSCO  was  interested  in  identifying  a  common
international  “passport”  whereby  companies  could  be  accepted  for  secondary
listing in the jurisdiction of any IOSCO member. The concept was that, whatever
the listing rules in a company’s primary stock exchange, there would be a common
minimum  package  which  all  stock  exchanges  would  accept  from  foreignStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
55
companies seeking a secondary listing. IOSCO was prepared to endorse IFRS as
the  financial  reporting  basis  for  this  passport,  provided  that  the  international
standards  could  be  brought  up  to  a  quality  and  comprehensiveness  level  that
IOSCO stipulated.
Historically, a major criticism of IFRS had been that it essentially endorsed
all  the  accounting  methods  then  in  wide  use,  effectively  becoming  a  “lowest
common denominator” set of standards. The trend in national GAAP had been to
narrow the range of acceptable alternatives, although uniformity in accounting had
not been anticipated as a near-term result.  The IOSCO agreement energized IASC
to improve the existing standards by removing the many alternative treatments that
were then permitted under the standards, thereby improving comparability across
reporting  entities.  The  IASC  launched  its  Comparability  and  Improvements
Project with the goal of developing a “core set of standards” that would satisfy
IOSCO.  These  were  complete  by  1993,  not  without  difficulties  and  spirited
disagreements among the members, but then - to the great frustration of the IASC -
these  were  not  accepted  by  IOSCO.  Rather  than  endorsing  the  standard-setting
process  of  IASC,  as  was  hoped  for,  IOSCO  seemingly  wanted  to  cherry-pick
individual  standards.  Such  a  process  could  not  realistically  result  in  near-term
endorsement of IFRS for cross-border securities registrations.
Ultimately, the collaboration was relaunched in 1995, with IASC under
new leadership, and this began a further period of frenetic activities, where existing
standards were again reviewed and revised, and new standards were created to fill
perceived gaps in IFRS.  This time the set of standards included, amongst others,
IAS  39,  on  recognition  and  measurement  of  financial  instruments,  which  was
endorsed,  at  the  very  last  moment  and  with  great  difficulty,  as  a  compromise,
purportedly interim standard.
At the same time, the IASC had undertaken an effort to consider its future
structure. In part, this was the result of pressure exerted by the US SEC and also by
the US private sector standard setter, the FASB, which were seemingly concerned
that IFRS were not being developed by “due process.” While the various parties
may have had their own agendas, in fact the IFRS were in need of strengthening,
particularly as to reducing the range of diverse but accepted alternatives for similar
transactions and events. The challenges presented to IASB ultimately would serve
to make IFRS stronger.
If  IASC  was  to  be  the  standard  setter  endorsed  by  the  world’s  stock
exchange  regulators,  it  would  need  a  structure  that  reflected  that  level  of
responsibility.  The  historical  Anglo-Saxon  standard-setting  model -  where
professional accountants set the rules for themselves - ad largely been abandoned
in the twenty-five years since the IASC was formed, and standards were mostly
being set by dedicated and independent national boards such as the FASB, and not
by  profession-dominated  bodies  like  the  AICPA.  The  choice,  as  restructuring
became inevitable, was between a large, representative approach - much like the
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representatives -  or  a  small,  professional  body  of  experienced  standard  setters
which worked independently of national interests.
The  end  of  this  phase  of  the  international  standard  setting,  and  the
resolution  of  these  issues,  came  about  within  a  short  period  in  2000.  In  May,
IOSCO members voted at their annual meeting to endorse IASC standards, albeit
subject to a number of reservations (see discussion later in this chapter). This was a
considerable step forward for the IASC, which itself was quickly exceeded by an
announcement in June 2000 that the European Commission intended to adopt IFRS
as  the  requirement  for  primary  listings  in  all  member  states.  This  planned  full
endorsement by the EU eclipsed the lukewarm IOSCO approval, and since then the
EU has appeared to be the more influential body insofar as gaining acceptance for
IFRS has been  concerned. Indeed, the once-important IOSCO  endorsement has
become  of  little  importance  given  subsequent  developments,  including  the  EU
mandate and convergence efforts among several standard-setting bodies.
In July 2000, IASC members voted to abandon the organization’s former
structure,  which  was  based  on  professional  bodies,  and  adopt  a  new  structure:
beginning in 2001, standards would be set by a professional board, financed by
voluntary contributions raised by a new oversight body.
The IASB and the US
Although IASC and FASB were created almost contemporaneously, FASB
largely ignored IASB until the 1990s. It was only at the beginning of the 1990s that
FASB started to become interested in IASC. This was the period when IASC was
starting to work with IOSCO, a body in which the SEC has always had a powerful
voice. In effect, both the SEC and FASB were starting to consider the international
financial reporting area, and IASC was also starting to take initiatives to encourage
standard setters to meet together occasionally to debate technical issues of common
interest.
IOSCO’s  efforts  to  create  a  single  passport  for  secondary  listings,  and
IASC’s role as its standard setter, while intended to operate worldwide, would have
the greatest practical significance for foreign issuers in terms of the US market. It
was understood that if the SEC were to accept IFRS in place of US GAAP, there
would be no need for a Form 20-F reconciliation, and access to the US markets
would be greatly facilitated. The SEC has therefore been a key actor in the later
evolution of IASC. It encouraged IASC to build a relationship with IOSCO in
1987.  It also observed that there were too many options under IAS, and that it
would be more favorably inclined to consider acceptance of IAS (now IFRS) if
such alternatives were reduced. When IASC restarted its IOSCO work in 1995, the
SEC issued a statement (April 1996) saying that, to be acceptable, IFRS would
need to satisfy three criteria:
1.They must include a core set of standards that constituted a comprehensive basis
of accounting;
2.The standards must be high quality, and enable investors to analyze performance
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3.The  standards  must  be  rigorously  interpreted  and  applied,  because  otherwise
comparability and transparency would not be achieved.
The plan was predicated on the completion of a core set of standards, then
handing these over to IOSCO, which in turn would ask its members to evaluate
them, and finally IOSCO would issue its verdict. It was in this context that the SEC
issued  a  “concept  release”  in  2000,  in  which  it  asked  for  comments  on  the
acceptability of the core set of standards, but crucially on whether there was a
sufficient compliance and enforcement mechanism to ensure that standards were
consistently and rigorously applied by preparers, that auditors would ensure this
and stock exchange regulators would check compliance.
This  latter  element  is  something  which  remains  beyond  the  control  of
IASB, which is the domain of national bodies or professional organizations in each
jurisdiction. The Standards Interpretations Committee was formed to help ensure
uniform interpretation, and IFRIC has taken a number of initiatives to build liaison
channels with stock exchange regulators and national interpretations bodies, but the
rest  is  in  the  hands  of  the  auditors,  the  audit  oversight  bodies,  and  the  stock
exchange oversight bodies. The SEC concepts release resulted in many comment
letters, which can be viewed on the SEC Web site (www.sec.gov), but in the five
years since its issue, the SEC has taken no definitive position.
The SEC’s stance at the time was that it genuinely wanted to see IFRS used
by foreign registrants, but that it preferred convergence (so that no reconciliation
would be necessary) to acceptance without reconciliation of the IFRS as they were
in  2000.    In  the  years  since,  the  SEC  in  its  public  pronouncements  regularly
supports  convergence  and  has  strongly  implied  that  reconciliations  might  be
waived as soon as 2008 if convergence progress continues to be made.  Thus, for
example, the SEC welcomed publicly the changes to US standards proposed by the
FASB in December 2003, made to converge with IFRS.
Relations between FASB and IASB have grown warmer since IASB was
restructured,  perhaps  influenced  by  the  growing  awareness  that  IASB  would
assume a commanding position in the financial reporting standard-setting domain.
The FASB joined the IASB for informal meetings in the early 1990s, and this led
to  the  creation  of  the  G4+1  group  of  Anglo-Saxon  standard  setters  (US,  UK,
Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  with  the  IASC  as  an  observer)  in  which
FASB was an active participant. IASB and FASB signed the Norwalk Agreement
in October 2002, which set out a program of convergence, and their staffs now
work  together  on  a  number  of  projects,  including  business  combinations  and
revenue recognition. Video links are used to enable staff to observe and participate
in board meetings. The two boards have a joint agenda committee whose aim is to
harmonize the timing with which the boards discuss the same subjects.  The boards
are also committed to meeting twice a year in joint session.
However, there remain problems, largely of the structural variety. FASB
works in a specific national legal framework, while IASB does not. Equally, both
have what they term “inherited” GAAP (i.e., differences in approach that have a
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detailed, prescriptive (“rules-based”) standards that give bright line audit guidance,
which are intended to make compliance control easier and remove uncertainties. In
the post-Enron world, after it became clear that such prescriptive rules had been
abused,  there  was  a  flurry  of  interest  in  standards  that  supposedly  express  an
objective and then explain how to reach it (“principles-based” standards), without
attempting to prescribe responses to every conceivable fact pattern. However, as
the SEC study (mandated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) into principles-
based  standards  observed,  use  of  principles  alone,  without  detailed  guidance,
reduces comparability. The litigation environment in the US also makes companies
and  auditors  reluctant  to  step  into  areas  where  judgments  have  to  be  taken  in
uncertain conditions.
Events in the mid - to late - 2000s have served to accelerate the pressure
for full convergence between US GAAP and IFRS.  In fact, the US SEC’s decision
in late 2007 to waive reconciliation requirements for foreign registrants complying
with  “full  IFRS”  is  an  early  indicator  that  convergence  may  be  made  almost
irrelevant by the move to adopt IFRS. If, as is being considered, the SEC grants
US registrants the right to use IFRS, there will be considerable momentum for a
wholesale abandonment of US GAAP in favor of IFRS.  At first, this will likely
involve moves by multinational and other larger business entities, having trade or
other relationships with entities already preparing financial statements under IFRS.
In the longer run, even medium-and smaller-sized entities will probably opt for
IFRS-based financial reporting, since some involvement in international trade is
increasingly a characteristic of all business operations.
The IASB and Europe
While  France,  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK  were  founding
members of IASC and have remained heavily involved, the European Commission
as such has generally had a difficult relationship with the international standard
setter. The EC did not participate in any way until 1990, when it finally became an
observer at Board meetings. It had had its own regional program of harmonization
since the 1960s and in effect only officially abandoned this in 1995, when, in a
policy paper, it recommended to member states that they seek to align their rules
for  consolidated  financial  statements  on  IFRS.  Notwithstanding  this,  the
Commission  gave  IASB  a  great  boost  when  it  announced  in  June  2000  that it
wanted to require all listed companies throughout the EU to use IFRS beginning in
2005  as  part  of  its  initiative  to  build  a  single  European  financial  market.  This
intention was made concrete with the approval of the IFRS Regulation in June
2002  by  the  European  Council  of  Ministers  (the  supreme  EU  decision-making
authority).
The EU decision was all the more impressive in that, to be effective in
legal terms, IFRS have to become enshrined in EU statute law, creating a situation
where the EU is in effect rubber-stamping laws created by a small, self-appointed,
private sector body. This proved to be a delicate situation, which proved within a
very short time that it contained the seeds of unending disagreements:  politicians
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and were soon being lobbied by corporate interests that had failed to influence
IASB directly to achieve their objectives. The EU endorsement of IFRS turns out
to have the cost of exposing IASB to political pressures in the same way that FASB
has at times been the focus of congressional manipulations in the US (e.g., over
stock-based compensation accounting rules).
The EU created an elaborate machinery to mediate its relations with IASB.
It preferred to work with another private sector body, created for the purpose, as
the  formal  conduit  for  EU  inputs  to  IASB.  The  European  Financial  Reporting
Advisory  Group  (EFRAG)  was  formed  in  2001  by  a  collection  of  European
representative  organizations  (for  details  see  www.efrag.org),  including  the
European  Accounting  Federation  (FEE)  and  European  employer  organization
(UNICE). This in turn formed a small Technical Expert Group (TEG) which does
the detailed work on IASB proposals.  EFRAG consults widely within the EU, and
particularly with national standard setters and the European Commission to canvass
views on IASB proposals, and provides inputs to IASB. It responds formally to all
discussion papers and Exposure Drafts.
At a second stage, when a final standard is issued, EFRAG is asked by the
Commission to provide a report on the standard. This report should state whether
the  standard  has  the  required  qualities  and  is  in  conformity  with  the  European
company law directives. The European Commission then asks a new committee,
the Accounting Regulation Committee (ARC), whether it wishes to endorse the
standard.  ARC  consists  of  permanent  representatives  of  the  EU  member  state
governments. It should normally only fail to endorse IFRS if it believes they are
not in  conformity  with the  overall  framework  of  EU  law;  it  should  not  take  a
strategic or policy view.  However, the European Parliament also has the right to
comment,  if  it  wishes.  If  ARC  fails  to  endorse  a  standard,  the  European
Commission may still ask the Council of Ministers to override that decision.
Experience has shown that the system suffers from a number of problems.
First, although EFRAG is intended to enhance EU inputs to IASB, it may in fact
isolate people from IASB, or at least increase the costs of making representations.
For example, when IASB revealed its intentions of issuing a standard on stock
options, it received nearly a hundred comment letters from US companies (who
report under US GAAP, not IFRS), but only one from EFRAG, which represented
about 90% of IASB’s constituents in the early 2000s. It is easy to feel in this
context that EFRAG is seen at IASB as a single respondent, so people who have
made  the  effort  to  work  through  EFRAG  feel  under-represented.  In  addition,
EFRAG  is  bound to  present  a  distillation  of  views,  so  it  is  already  filtering
respondents’  views  before  they  even  reach  IASB.  The  only  recourse  is  for
respondents to make representations not only to EFRAG but also directly to IASB.
However, resistance to the financial instruments standards, IAS 32 and IAS
39, put the system under specific strain. These standards were already in existence
when  the  European  Commission  announced  its  decision  to  adopt  IFRS  for
European listed companies, and had been exhaustively debated before enactment.
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The first task of EFRAG and ARC was to endorse the existing standards of
IASB. They did this—but excluded IAS 32 and 39 on the grounds that they were
being extensively revised as part of IASB’s then-ongoing Improvements Project.
During  the  exposure  period  of  the  improvements  proposals -  which
exceptionally  included  round  table  meetings  with  constituents -  the  European
Banking Federation, under particular pressure from French banks, lobbied IASB to
modify the standard to permit special accounting for macrohedging.  The IASB
agreed to do this, even though that meant the issuance of a new Exposure Draft and
a further amendment to IAS 39 (which was finally issued in March 2004). The
bankers  did  not like  the  terms  of  the  amendment,  and  while  it  was  still  under
discussion, they appealed to the French president and persuaded him to intervene.
He  wrote  to  the  European  Commission  in  July  2003,  saying  that  the  financial
instruments  standards  were  likely  to  make  banks’  figures  volatile,  would
destabilize the European economy, and should not be approved.  He also said that
the Commission did not have a sufficient input to the standard-setting process.
This desire to alter the requirements of IAS 39 was further compounded
when the European Central Bank complained in February 2004 that the “fair value
option,” introduced to IAS 39 as an improvement in final form in December 2003,
could be used by banks to manipulate their prudential ratios, and asked IASB to
limit the circumstances in which the option could be used.  IASB agreed to do this,
although again this meant issuing an Exposure Draft and a further amendment to
IAS 39 which was not finalized until mid-2005. IASB, when it debated the issue,
took a pragmatic line that no compromise of principle was involved, and that the
principal  bank  regulator  of  the  Board’s  largest  constituent  by  far  should  be
accommodated.  The  fact  that  the  European  Central  Bank  had  not  raised  these
issues  at  the  original  Exposure  Draft  stage  was  not  discussed,  nor  was  the
legitimacy of a constituent deciding unilaterally it wanted to change a rule that had
just been approved. The Accounting Standards Board of Japan lodged a formal
protest and many other constituents have not been delighted.
Ultimately, ARC approved IAS 32 and IAS 39, but a “carve out” from IAS
39 was prescribed.  Clearly the EU’s involvement with IFRS is proving to be a
mixed blessing for IASB, both exposing it to political pressures that are properly an
issue  for  the  Commission,  not  IASB,  and  putting  its  due  process  under  stress.
Some commentators consider that the EU might abandon IFRS, but this is not a
realistic possibility, given that the EU has already tried and rejected the regional
standard setting route. What is more probable is that we are enduring a period of
adjustment,  with  both  regulators  and  lobbyists  uncertain  as  to  how  exactly  the
system works, testing its limits, but with some modus vivendi evolving over time.
However, it is severe distraction for IASB that financial instruments, arguably the
controversy of the 1990s, is still causing trouble, when it has on its agenda more
radical  ideas  in  the  areas  of  revenue  recognition,  performance  reporting  and
insurance contracts.Studia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                    Seria Ştiinţe Economice  Anul 21/2011 Partea I
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Conclusion
The so-called “carve-outs” have most recently had the result that the US
SEC’s historic decision to eliminate reconciliation to US GAAP for foreign private
issuers has been restricted to those registrants that file financial statements that
comply  with  “full  IFRS”  (i.e.,  those  using  “Euro-IFRS”  and  other  national
adaptations  of  IFRS  as  promulgated  by  the  IASB  will  not  be  eligible  for  this
deletion).  Registrants using any derivation of IFRS, and those using any national
GAAP, will continue to be required to present a reconciliation to US GAAP.  Over
time, it can be assumed that this will add to the pressure to report under “full
IFRS.”
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